Al Qaeda has long been a monolith, though operating as a Multinational Corporate.
It had a Central Command and the structures though cut off directly from the directly,had a strict Unitary structure.
The Syrian Branch or the Franchisee of the Al Qaeda brushed aside the instruction from to stay away by Ayman al-Zawahri, the leader of Al Qaeda
It was the first time in the history of the world’s most notorious terrorist organization that one of the affiliates had publicly broken with the international leadership, and the news sent shock waves through the online forums where jihadists meet. In no uncertain terms, ISIS had gone rogue.
That split, in June, was a watershed moment in the vast decentralization of Al Qaeda and its ideology since 9/11. As the power of the central leadership created by Osama bin Laden has declined, the vanguard of violent jihad has been taken up by an array of groups in a dozen countries across Africa and the Middle East, attacking Western interests in Algeria and Libya, training bombers in Yemen, seizing territory in Syria and Iraq, and gunning down shoppers in Kenya.
What links these groups, experts say, is no longer a centralized organization but a loose ideology that any group can appropriate and apply as it sees fit while gaining the mystique of a recognized brand name. In short, Al Qaeda today is less a corporation than a vision driving a diverse spread of militant groups.
“Al Qaeda is kind of a ready-made kit now,” said William McCants, a scholar of militant Islam at the Brookings Institution. “It is a portable ideology that is entirely fleshed out, with its own symbols and ways of mobilizing people and money to the cause. In many ways, you don’t have to join the actual organization anymore to get those benefits.”
For policy makers and terrorism analysts, this has made it harder to define what it means to be “Al Qaeda” and to gauge and combat threats. In addition, disagreements over definitions of Al Qaeda have animated debates in Washington about the perpetrators of the 2012 attack on the American diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, especially over the Benghazi militant group Ansar al-Shariah. Although intelligence agencies and the State Department do not consider the group an affiliate of Al Qaeda, some Republican critics of President Obama argue that its puritanical, anti-Western vision makes it one.”
The US has made it tough for Al Qaeda Central command to function effectively after Osama Bin Laden’s Death.
Armed with Data from Osama’s hardD rive, the Al Qaeda Cells have been immobilized.
To operate effectively, a minimum autonomy was needed.
When that was granted, the Franchisees began to assert themselves.
This causes even more serious concern as it would be difficult to identify the Groups which operate under Al Qaeda and becomes very tough in handling Terrorist threats.