a Zoo, vetoing Air Surveillance!
Equal measure of responsibility by the then Political Masters who wanted to play to the International Gallery.
While it is reported that the Army tried to destroy the Documents relating to Kargil War, the Congress, in the opposition then made a cursory
noise,possibly a reciprocal arrangement for BJP not putting up adequate pressure on Security issues.
And note the Candidates being put up by the Congress against Modi!
Viva La Democracy!
“Establishment India and its non-official spokespersons insist, despite a string of media exposes, that there were no institutional military failures in the months before the war. Over the last 14 months, the most damning pieces of evidence of such failur es have been discredited and suppressed. Claims that Brigadier Surinder Singh, the then Commander of the 121 Brigade, warned of possible conflict have been flatly rejected by officials as untrue. ..
The documents also show that his superiors, including former Chief of the Army Staff V.P. Malik, refused to act on these warnings, and even blocked 121 Brigade initiatives to defend Kargil more intensively. Wh ile the broad contents of the 121 Brigade papers have figured in several publications, including Frontline, this is the first time the original documents have been acquired and made available to the public.
WHAT MALIK WAS TOLD
On August 25, 1998, Major R.K. Dwivedi, the Brigade-Major of the 121 Brigade, sent out a letter marked 124/GSD/Vis. To this letter were attached the contents of Surinder Singh’s proposed briefing of Malik on the security situation in Kargil, scheduled to take place during the Chief of the Army Staff’s visit to Kargil the following month. The 42-point document was, during the final presentation, backed by slides.
Right at the outset, the 121 Brigade briefing paper analysed, in terse military shorthand, the possible “En(emy) Pattern” for the coming months. Pakistan, paragraph 5(a) noted, would seek to keep conflict “alive after (the Pokhran-II) nuc(lear) blasts an d in view (of the) SAARC m(ee)t(in)g of 29 Jul(y) 98 and now for (the) NAM m(ee)t(in)g.”..
3 Division took the best part of a fortnight to get back to this letter. Major V.K. Chattre, General Staff Officer 2 to the officiating Colonel General Staff, wasted few words. “Your proposal is not approved,” letter 1124/Trg flatly said. 15 Corps Headqu arters in Srinagar, at that time in charge of the 3 Infantry Division, did not see fit to intervene in the debate. Requests for additional troops were not even graced with a reply. One letter generated by the 121 Brigade’s Major R.K. Dwivedi, on behalf o f Surinder Singh, marked 101/GS(Ops)/ANE, pointed to a recent mine explosion on the highway, and underlined the need for troops to protect the road and vulnerable villages. No troops were deployed. Indeed, despite the 121 Brigade’s protests, the 9 Mahar Regiment was actually withdrawn, leaving the Yaldor area wide open.
FIVE HUNDRED IRREGULARS, AND A ZOO
Nothing better illustrates the space between the worlds of 3 Division Headquarters and the 121 Brigade than two letters that form part of the papers Frontline’s investigation has unearthed.
On May 16, 1998, 3 Division sent out instructions to all its field units informing them of their commanding officer, Major-General V.S. Budhwar’s new pet project: building a zoo for the sake of Leh‘s few thousand residents. Lieutenant-Colonel U.K. Singh sent out a second missive, marked 6361/9/ZOO/Q1 on June 8, 1998. “Please ensure,” the Colonel’s letter read, “that various types of wild animals/birds are procured and despatched to zoo at Leh at your earliest.” “Cages required for transportation of anim als/birds,” it continued, “will be made under arrangements of respective b(riga)de(s).” “No representation,” the Colonel concluded sternly, “will be entertained.”
Source Link above .Frontline