ramanan50

Sri Lanka Tamils Killing India Involved ? PPT

In India, Sri Lanka, SriLanka on December 12, 2013 at 19:06

India has been reluctant to take on Sri Lanka on the genocide issue.

Tamils being killed in Sri Lanka.Image from the daily mail.

Tamil Kills India Involved?

The reason touted is the geopolitical considerations, implying that China might get a foot hold in Sri Lanka.

Creation of Tamil Elam might result in Greater Tamil Elam facilitating the secession of Tamil Nadu from India.

The third, in my view is the anger at the Tamils  for the killing of Rajiv Gandhi.

All the political parties played the Tamil Card, for vote politics in Tamil Nadu, by alternately supporting and withdrawing support to the LTTE.

On the one hand, India will train LTTE, allow LTTE Chief Prabhakaran to stay in India  excaping from Sri Lankan Authorities,

MGR will donate publicly to Prabhakaran and when Centre raised its eyebrows started condemning the Terrorists.

Karunanidhi can outclassed all, by speaking in all voices at the same time, for and against LTTE, for and against Tamil Elam!

Relatively Jayalalithaa is consistent in terming LTTE as Terrorists and wanted them banned in India and whenever she was/in power terrorist activities will wane.

Now onto India’s complicity.

Indi has contributed immensely by way of Intelligence to Sri Lanka in the final stages of the last war.

In fact India knew of the massacre.

PPT  speaks of UK and US in being silent spectators, India has been said to be involved in the Killing of the tamils and India’s Role will be probed.

While the judges held the USA and the UK to be complicit in the genocidal process, they were of the opinion that more evidence was needed as regards India’s role.”

http://www.tamilnet.com/img/publish/2013/12/PPT_II_Verdict_Press_Release.pdf

India and Sri Lanka double speak in 2009.

Terming India its “closest ally”, Sri Lanka has said its support during the war with the LTTE helped “reduce the pressure” mounted by the world community and allowed it to proceed with humanitarian operations in the war-ravaged north unhindered.

“The relationship developed over the past four years with our closest ally, India helped us in many ways in our war against terrorism,” the powerful Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa said.

India’s support greatly helped “reduce the pressure mounted by other nations,” which allowed us to proceed with our humanitarian operations unhindered, Rajapaksa the brother of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa said in Colombo on Sunday in Colombo.

“It is very important that we strengthen this key relationship even further in the years to come,” he said while speaking at a function in Colombo.

Persuading western countries that they must help Sri Lanka more meaningfully to combat this threat requires us to unite as a nation and speak with one voice, instead of being weakened and divided by petty considerations, he said.

He said significant support was also received from other key allies that helped withstand the pressure being “directed by the international community to leave the war unfinished.”

“These countries also provided us vital material assistance towards the war effort, when barriers were put in place that prevented our obtaining military hardware from our western allies,” Rajapaksa said in his address.

He said even though the Tiger rebels will not be able to resurface in Sri Lanka, their financial network was a matter of concern.”

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indias-help-during-ltte-war-reduced-pressure-sri-lanka/542168/

 

How India was involved.

3.2  Eelam War IV
The so‐called Fourth Eelam War resulted from a gradual breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire.
Specifically, in April 2003 the LTTE announced its unilateral withdrawal from peace negotia‐
tions after it was excluded from a preparatory meeting of a donor conference taking place in
the U.S., where the LTTE was categorized as a terrorist organization.4 At least formally, the
ceasefire survived for nearly five more years, but in 2004 an undeclared war between LTTE
and government forces flared up again (HRW 2005). By July 2006, the ceasefire had de facto
collapsed.
At the same time, the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa as Sri Lanka’s executive president in
November 2005 in a coalition with hard‐line Sinhalese parties constituted the precondition
for a much tougher stance against the LTTE. Rajapaksa strengthened Sri Lanka’s military ca‐
pabilities and established a “highly personalized, authoritarian regime, in which extreme na‐
tionalist views [were] widely accepted” (ICG 2007: 21). Not only the LTTE displayed a will‐
ingness to provoke the government and to resume the war, but also the government seemed
to be keen on a “fight to the finish” (Reddy 2006): “[w]hat was new in the Rajapaksa admini‐
stration’s approach was the goal of defeating, as opposed to weakening, the LTTE militarily
and then making the LTTE irrelevant to any political solution to the ethnic conflict” (Uyan‐
goda 2009).
3   At the same time, India refused to take part in multilateral initiatives regarding Sri Lanka, for example in donor
conferences. As one interviewee put it, “at the donor conferences India was present as an observer but it would
not join a multilateral agreement in its own region!” Interview with expert, New Delhi, November 25, 2008.
4   See “Exclusion from donors conference undermines peace process”, TamilNet, April 4, 2003, at:
net.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=8673> (May 25, 2009). Destradi: India and the Civil Warin Sri Lanka: On the Failures ofRegional Conflict Management in SouthAsia 11
In an unprecedented military offensive, Sri Lankan government forces gradually re‐con‐
quered the territories under LTTE control—the East in 2007 and, step by step, also the North‐
ern province. When the Sri Lankan military crossed the border of the Kilinochchi district, the
displacement  of  a  huge  number  of  civilians—estimated to  be  as  high  as  200,000—began
(Fuller 2009). On January 2, 2009, the city of Kilinochchi, which had been the Tigers’ adminis‐
trative  capital  since 1995, fell into the hands of the government forces after a long  siege.
Trapped between the advancing Sri Lankan armed forces and the retreating LTTE rebels, the
civilians were used by the LTTE as human shields and subjected to “intentional shelling” by
the government forces (ICG 2010: i). By mid‐January 2009, the LTTE had been confined to a
small jungle area in the Mullaithivu district, a space that continued to shrink up until the
LTTE’s military defeat and the death of its leadership in May 2009.
Not only was the final phase of the war characterized by massive violations of interna‐
tional humanitarian law on both sides,5 but according to UN estimates, as of May 22, 2009,
there were also at least 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka (UN 2009a).
The civilians who managed to escape from the conflict zone were subject to a “screening” by
the government, which feared that LTTE cadres might have mingled with the refugees. Ap‐
proximately 250,000 IDPs were put in militarily controlled refugee camps, to which interna‐
tional aid agencies were given only partial access. Even though many countries pressured
Colombo, they did not manage to induce a policy change on the part of the Sri Lankan gov‐
ernment.  China  and Japan,  along  with Russia  and  Vietnam,  prevented the  UN  Security
Council from discussing the Sri Lankan issue, defined as an internal matter of Sri Lanka
(Nessman 2009). And even India, as is illustrated in the following sections, supported the Sri
Lankan government.
President Rajapaksa, strengthened by his military victory, quickly consolidated his power
position by winning the presidential election of January 2010 and, with his party, the general
election of April 2010. Rajapaksa repeatedly refused an international investigation of war
crimes and human rights violations, as he argued they impinged on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty
(ICG 2010: 31). The Sri Lankan regime, in the meantime, has been assuming increasingly au‐
thoritarian traits, exemplified by the power concentrated in Rajapaksa’s family’s hands, an
almost total lack of press freedom (Schlütter 2010: 1), about 10,000 Sri Lankan citizens being
held for over a year for assumed involvement in LTTE activities (ICG 2010: 31), an increasingly
militarized governance culture (Senanayake 2009: 824), and no signs of willingness to find a
political situation providing for a meaningful devolution of power to the Tamil minority.

 http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp154_destradi.pdf

 

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