I&B have uploaded excellent Videos of Inspiring Speeches,Music and rare documentaries of the Independence Struggle in YouTube .
Like Rajaji(C.Rajagopalachari0 was a Statesman, who did not bother popularity.
He did what was Right was for the Country and obviously not popular as he did not play to the Gallery.
He was a Man who called Nehru wrong when Nehru was wrong when none was prepared to point it out scared of the charisma of Nehru.
My dear Jawaharlal,
Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes’ notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of “whoever is not with them being against them”, this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.”
Nehru paid for his folly when China invaded India in 1962 and Nehru died a disillusioned Man.
Liberation Of Hyderabad from The Nizam.(Daily pioneer)-How Vindictive was Nehru?
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister of India, whose 137th birth anniversary is on October 31, was insulted, humiliated and disgraced by the then Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, during a Cabinet meeting. “You are a complete communalist and I’ll never be a party to your suggestions and proposals,” Nehru shouted at Patel during a crucial Cabinet meeting to discuss the liberation of Hyderabad by the Army from the tyranny of the Razakkars, the then Nizam’s private army.
- Views On Partition of India.
Foresight in accepting Partition
But the greatest of his foresights was shown by the way he dealt with the crisis created by Muslim League after it entered the Interim Government on 25th October 1946. He was the first to realize that the League had created a vertical divide in the entire governmental machinery on a communal basis, up from a Member (Minister) down to the lowest peon. There was a virtual inter-Departmental (the term Ministry was used only after Independence) war on the Raisina Hill. The League was making a determined attempt to demonstrate that Hindus and Muslims could not work together, to strengthen the notion that partition of the country was unavoidable. In fact, the League had already, in a way, created several Pakistans on Indian soil, if one looked at the working of the Departments of Finance, Industry, Health, Posts & Air, which were under League Members; Liaqat Ali, the Finance Member, presented the Finance Bill (Central Budget) of 1947 to the Central Assembly without showing it in advance to Nehru, who was the leader of the Interim Government.
“How can the country be governed in such a divided way, now and in future?” Patel is reported to have wondered. Nehru was angry with the League, but it was Patel whose prescience helped him and the country to realize the inevitability of the Partition. It was neither defeatism nor a hurry to capture power, as has been imputed to both of them in subsequent years. It was nothing short of foresight and wisdom which Poet Tulsi Das had advocated in the 16th century in this famous verse: “Budh ardh tajain, lukh sarvasa jata” (the wise give up half when they see the whole is going).(dadinani.com)(PC Modi)
Patel was intensely loyal to Gandhi and both he and Nehru looked to him to arbitrate disputes. However, Nehru and Patel sparred over national issues. When Nehru asserted control over Kashmir policy, Patel objected to Nehru’s sidelining his home ministry’s officials. Nehru was offended by Patel’s decision-making regarding the states’ integration, having neither consulted him nor the cabinet. Patel asked Gandhi to relieve him of his obligation to serve, knowing that he lacked Nehru’s youth and popularity. He believed that an open political battle would hurt India. After much personal deliberation and contrary to Patel’s prediction, Gandhi on 30 January 1948 told Patel not to leave the government. A free India, according to Gandhi, needed both Patel and Nehru. Patel was the last man to privately talk with Gandhi, who was assassinated just minutes after Patel’s departure. At Gandhi’s wake, Nehru and Patel embraced each other and addressed the nation together. Patel gave solace to many associates and friends and immediately moved to forestall any possible violence. Within two months of Gandhi’s death, Patel suffered a major heart attack; the timely action of his daughter, his secretary and nurse saved Patel’s life. Speaking later, Patel attributed the attack to the “grief bottled up” due to Gandhi’s death.
Criticism arose from the media and other politicians that Patel’s home ministry had failed to protect Gandhi. Emotionally exhausted, Patel tendered a letter of resignation, offering to leave the government. Patel’s secretary persuaded him to withhold the letter, seeing it as fodder for Patel’s political enemies and political conflict in India. However, Nehru sent Patel a letter dismissing any question of personal differences and his desire for Patel’s ouster. He reminded Patel of their 30-year partnership in the freedom struggle and asserted that after Gandhi’s death, it was especially wrong for them to quarrel. Nehru, Rajagopalachari and other Congressmen publicly defended Patel. Moved, Patel publicly endorsed Nehru’s leadership and refuted any suggestion of discord. Patel publicly dispelled any notion that he sought to be prime minister. Though the two committed themselves to joint leadership and non-interference in Congress party affairs, they would criticise each other in matters of policy, clashing on the issues of Hyderabad’s integration and UN mediation in Kashmir. Nehru declined Patel’s counsel on sending assistance to Tibet after its 1950 invasion by the People’s Republic of China and ejecting the Portuguese from Goa by military force.
When Nehru pressured Dr. Rajendra Prasad to decline a nomination to become the first President of India in 1950 in favour of Rajagopalachari, he thus angered the party, which felt Nehru was attempting to impose his will. Nehru sought Patel’s help in winning the party over, but Patel declined and Prasad was duly elected. Nehru opposed the 1950 Congress presidential candidatePurushottam Das Tandon, a conservative Hindu leader, endorsing Jivatram Kripalani instead and threatening to resign if Tandon was elected. Patel rejected Nehru’s views and endorsed Tandon in Gujarat, where Kripalani received not one vote despite hailing from that state himself. Patel believed Nehru had to understand that his will was not law with the Congress, but he personally discouraged Nehru from resigning after the latter felt that the party had no confidence in him.(Wiki)